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Abstract
Most studies using microsimulation techniques have considered the
eﬀect of potential reforms, but only regarding income distribution. How-
ever, it has become increasingly recognised, both at the academic and
political level, that focusing purely on income provides a limited picture
of social progress. We illustrate how ex-ante policy evaluation can be per-
formed in terms of richer concepts of individual well-being, such as sub-
jective life satisfaction and equivalent incomes. Our analysis makes use
of EUROMOD, the EU-wide tax-beneﬁt microsimulation model, along
with 2013 EU-SILC data for Sweden, which for the ﬁrst time provides
information on subjective well-being. Our results show that the eﬀect of
potential reforms varies widely depending on the well-being concept used
in the evaluation. We discuss the normative questions that are raised by
this ﬁnding.
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1 Introduction
Tax-beneﬁt microsimulation models have proved to be a powerful tool for ex-
ante evaluation of policy reforms. Until now most applications have considered
the eﬀect of potential reforms on income distribution only, implicitly assuming
that the measure of individual well-being to focus on is income. At the same
time, it has become increasingly recognised, both at the academic and political
level, that focusing exclusively on income provides only a limited picture of social
progress (see, e.g., the report by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). In addition
to income, life dimensions such as health, employment, leisure, housing and
environmental quality are also highly valued as determinants of a good life, and
should be taken into account in policy evaluation. The aim of this paper is to
illustrate how microsimulation can be used for the ex-ante evaluation of policy
reforms within such a richer evaluative framework.
The obvious ﬁrst step in such an analysis is the prediction of policy eﬀects
regarding the diﬀerent dimensions of life. In this exercise, it is important to
take cross-eﬀects into account. As an example, a larger income may have an
eﬀect on health, while a better health may inﬂuence the earning capacity of
individuals. From a normative point of view, predicting the eﬀects of policies
on diﬀerent dimensions separately may be suﬃcient, e.g. to calculate multi-
dimensional inequality. However, in many cases, clear-cut results will only be
obtained if one manages to aggregate the diﬀerent life dimensions into a single
indicator of individual well-being. There is no consensus in the literature on
the best measure of individual well-being.1 We will therefore show the results
for two diﬀerent concepts: subjective life satisfaction and equivalent income. In
section 2 we brieﬂy sketch the normative intuitions behind these concepts and
explain which empirical information is needed for their implementation.
Our empirical work is based on the SILC 2013 data for Sweden. SILC 2013
contains detailed information on income components, employment, self-assessed
health, housing conditions and, for the ﬁrst time, a module on subjective well-
being with information on life satisfaction and emotions. We use the EU-wide
tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD to calculate household disposable income. In
section 3 we sketch a picture of the distribution of well-being in Sweden for the
three welfare concepts used in this paper (disposable income, life satisfaction,
equivalent income), and we show that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
these three views. This oﬀers the basis from which we proceed to evaluate the
eﬀects of four counterfactual tax-beneﬁt policy reforms: an additional payment
for recipients of social assistance, an increase in the basic amount of child beneﬁt,
an additional payment of housing allowance for pensioners, and an improvement
in the quality of low-quality housing. In each case, budget neutrality is achieved
by increasing the top rate of the government tax. We analyse the eﬀects of these
policies in section 4. Again, the choice of well-being measure has a signiﬁcant
impact on the evaluation results. Note that our fourth reform only results
in losers if we focus exclusively on disposable income, since the gainers see the
1An overview of the debate and a critical discussion of the diﬀerent possibilities can be
found in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015a).
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quality of their houses improved but do not receive any income transfer. Section
5 concludes.
Our paper conveys two messages. First, it highlights the feasibility of eval-
uating (ex-ante) the eﬀect of policy reforms not only on income but also on
other well-being indicators. Non-monetary policies have an important eﬀect on
well-being, and this eﬀect is disregarded if policy evaluation is restricted to an
assessment in terms of income. Second, it shows the importance of comparing
diﬀerent well-being indicators to assess the potential eﬀect of a policy reform.
2 Measures of individual well-being
In this section we describe our three measures of individual well-being (dispos-
able income, subjective well-being and equivalent income) and discuss how they
can be implemented empirically for ex-ante policy evaluation.
2.1 Income and other life dimensions
The vast majority of studies interested in assessing the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt
policy reforms have opted for disposable income as a measure of individual
well-being. Disposable income is a function of market income, individual and
household characteristics, and the tax-beneﬁt system. More formally, let yi
represent disposable income of individual i, ωi market income and zi a vector of
individual and household characteristics that are relevant within the tax-beneﬁt
regulations of the country. Then disposable income is given by:
yi = d (ωi, zi, py) , (1)
where d(.) represents the tax-beneﬁt function transforming market income and
individual and household characteristics into disposable income, where py is a
set of parameters of the tax-beneﬁt system (e.g. maximum beneﬁt amounts,
minimum thresholds for social insurance contributions, level of tax bands, etc.).
Provided that detailed information about market incomes, individual and house-
hold characteristics, and the parameters (i.e. the rules) of tax-beneﬁt policies
in a country are available, tax-beneﬁt microsimulation models can be used to
calculate the disposable income of all individuals in the sample.
Nearly everybody agrees that yi is indeed an important determinant of well-
being. When we restrict ourselves to income, however, we neglect the eﬀects of
policies on other life dimensions (such as health, quality of housing, employment,
etc.) that are also important determinants of well-being for most individuals.
We denote these other life dimensions by li. Analogously with eq. (1), we can
write that lij , the level of life dimension j reached by individual i, is determined
by his income yi, the quality of other life dimensions li(−j), a vector of policy
parameters plj and relevant individual characteristics zi:
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lij = l(yi, li(−j), zi, plj , ij) (2)
2While there will be some overlap, the individual characteristics that are relevant for the
diﬀerent life dimensions do not coincide and are not identical with the individual characteristics
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with ij a disturbance term. If the necessary information is available, these eqs.
(2) can be estimated. It is then also possible to simulate the eﬀects of changes
in plj on the value lij , reached by individual i. Note that eqs. (1)-(2) describe a
system of equations. As an example, changes in py may aﬀect the non-income
life dimensions if yi has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in (2).
2.2 Subjective well-being
In some cases, e.g. when we only want to calculate the value of multidimen-
sional inequality or poverty (Aaberge and Brandolini, 2015), it is suﬃcient to
collect information on the vector (yi, li). However, for a full welfare evaluation it
is desirable to aggregate these diﬀerent dimensions into one overall measure of
individual well-being. One possibility for doing this is to use a set of objective
weights, the same for all individuals. Such an objective approach disregards the
fact that diﬀerent individuals may have very diﬀerent opinions about what is im-
portant in life, i.e. that they may have very diﬀerent preferences. The economic
tradition takes the position that such diﬀerences in individual preferences should
be respected. We will follow that tradition in this paper and restrict ourselves
to measures of well-being that respect preference heterogeneity.3
In recent years, subjective well-being measures, such as happiness and life
satisfaction measured with large representative surveys, have become increas-
ingly popular in this regard and some authors (e.g. Layard, 2005, O'Donnell
and Oswald, 2015) have advocated the use of these indicators in policy evalua-
tion. Numerous studies have indeed shown that non-monetary life dimensions,
in addition to income, are important determinants of subjective well-being. We
can therefore represent life satisfaction Si of individual i as a function
Si = Si (yi, li) . (3)
Eq. (3) can be estimated. After simulating the eﬀects of a policy measure on
(yi, li) (based on (1)-(2)), we can use the estimated version of eq. (3) to also
simulate the eﬀect on individual life satisfaction.
Note that eq. (3) makes explicit that the life satisfaction function Si(.) is
individual-speciﬁc. This is deﬁnitely realistic, as it is a well-known fact that
two individuals with identical vectors (y, l) may experience a diﬀerent level of
subjective satisfaction. For the normative interpretation of using life satisfaction
as a measure of well-being, it is useful to distinguish between two causes of
these interindividual diﬀerences. First, as mentioned before, individuals may
that play a role in the tax-beneﬁt system. To simplify the notation, we still use the same
symbol zi in eqs. (1) and (2). One way to interpret this is to see zi as a vector containing
all individual characteristics, while keeping in mind that only a subset of these characteristics
will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on each of the separate dimensions, with the others having zero
eﬀect.
3Within economics the most inﬂuential objective approach is the capability approach, as
defended by Sen (1985) and Nussbaum (2000). A critical discussion of this approach can be
found in Decancq et al. (2015a) and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013). Decancq et al. (2016)
show how preference diﬀerences can be integrated into empirical applications of the capability
approach.
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have diﬀerent preferences, i.e. they may diﬀer in the relative importance they
attach to diﬀerent life dimensions. Second, even if two individuals have identical
preferences and the same bundle (y, l), they may still experience a diﬀerent level
of life satisfaction due to diﬀerent scalings of satisfaction. In economic jargon,
the former explanation leads to diﬀerences in marginal rates of substitution, the
latter refers to the cardinalization of the satisfaction function.
We have already argued that in a liberal society it is a natural assumption to
respect diﬀerences in satisfaction that reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences, i.e. to
consider that a person whose individual outcomes do not match his preferences
is indeed worse oﬀ. Being unemployed is worse for someone who attaches a large
importance to the social integration that comes with having a job. It is much
less clear, however, as to whether we should also respect scaling diﬀerences.
These diﬀerences mainly reﬂect individuals' aspirations and expectations. Let
us consider two examples. Suppose that Ann and Beth are in exactly the same
objective situation: they have the same income, the same health, the same
job situation, etc. Ann comes from a rich family and is used to an opulent
life, while Beth has poor parents and her actual situation is much better than
what she had expected in her childhood. As a result, Ann has a lower level of
subjective well-being than Beth. Should we then try to compensate Ann for
her misfortune of being born into a rich family? Or, consider two individuals
John and Jim, who both have a strong preference for not being disabled. Jim
has an accident and loses a limb. However, after some time he adapts to his
new situation: he still would prefer to be able-bodied but his satisfaction level
returns to what it was before the accident. Does this imply that we should
not take into account his loss of a limb in the evaluation of his well-being? In
fact, does this means that society in general should not care very much about
individuals losing a limb?4 Sen (1985, p. 21) has pointed out that subjective
well-being measures may suﬀer from what he calls physical-condition neglect:
A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high
up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulﬁllment if he or she has learned to have
`realistic' desires and to take pleasure in small mercies. If this is considered a
problem, one must look for a measure of individual well-being that does respect
diﬀerences in individual preferences but does not suﬀer from physical-condition
neglect. One possible candidate is equivalent income (Fleurbaey and Blanchet
2013, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011, Decancq et al., 2015a, 2015b, Schokkaert
et al. 2011).
2.3 Equivalent income
Equivalent income is deﬁned as the hypothetical income that, if combined with
the best possible value on all non-income dimensions, would place the individuals
in a situation that (s)he ﬁnds equally good as his/her actual situation. Let us
4This example is inspired by the empirical work of Loewenstein and Ubel (2008). The
literature documents many spectacular cases of adaptation. An extreme example is described
in Bruno et al. (2011), who show that even patients with locked-in syndrome can recover a
high degree of subjective life satisfaction.
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Figure 1: Equivalent income
explain its normative intuition using Figure 1, in which we depict a situation
with two life dimensions: income and health. The indiﬀerence curves through A
and B represent the preferences of two individuals Ann and Beth respectively.
We assume that society agrees that there is some level of health seen as perfect.
First consider a situation where Ann and Beth are both in X: they have
the same income and the same health level. If we want to respect individual
preferences, it does not necessarily follow from their identical objective outcomes
that they also enjoy the same level of well-being: in X the indiﬀerence curve
of Ann is steeper than that of Beth, showing that she is more concerned about
being (un)healthy. It is therefore natural to accept that Ann is worse oﬀ than
Beth. In general, preferences do matter. There is, however, one situation for
which it can be argued that preference diﬀerences should not matter, and this is
when both Ann and Beth are perfectly healthy. In this situation it would be very
strange to claim that either of the two has a lower well-being level because she
cares less (or more?) about her health. This means that when two individuals
are both in perfect health, we can compare their well-being on the basis of their
incomes, irrespective of their preferences. Combining this insight with respect
for individual preferences allows us to rank all possible situations. Assume that
Ann is in A and Beth in B. According to their own preferences, Ann is equally
well-oﬀ in A and A', and Beth is equally well-oﬀ in B and B'. Yet, in A' and B'
they are both in perfect health. Given that we then can evaluate the lives A'
and B' on the basis of their incomes, we can also evaluate A and B on the basis
of these incomes. The well-being of Ann (Beth) in A (B) can then be measured
by the equivalent income A (B) in Figure 1.
The criterion to set the reference values for the non-income dimensions is
therefore that at these reference values preference diﬀerences should not matter
for measuring well-being. If preferences can be assumed to be monotonic in a life
dimension that has a natural upper bound (as is the case for health), this upper
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bound is a natural choice for the reference value. If the non-income dimension
does not have an upper bound (e.g. quality of housing), one may use a value
that is close to the maximum of the observed distribution.5
It is clear that the equivalent income measure indeed respects individual
preferences. It does not suﬀer from physical-condition neglect. If two indi-
viduals hold the same preferences, the one on the higher indiﬀerence curve will
always have a larger equivalent income, independent of the (possibly individual-
speciﬁc) scaling of subjective well-being. The equivalent income measure there-
fore corrects for diﬀerences in aspirations. Despite the fact that it is expressed
in monetary terms (which has some practical advantages when it comes to mea-
surement), it is an encompassing measure of well-being taking into account the
well-being loss that follows from not achieving the reference values for the non-
income dimensions. In fact, in Figure 1 Ann in A has a larger monetary income
than Beth in B, but her equivalent income is lower because her health is worse.
The well-being loss is individual-speciﬁc as it does depend on the individual's
own preferences. Remember that the equivalent incomes of Ann and Beth would
be diﬀerent if they were both in situation X.
Implementation of the equivalent income measure requires information on
individual preferences. In this paper, we follow Decancq et al. (2015b) and
Schokkaert et al. (2011) and retrieve information about individual preferences
from subjective well-being regressions.6 This method is explained in the follow-
ing subsection.
2.4 Towards operational implementation: evaluating the
eﬀect of policy changes
As already mentioned before, we will use a tax-beneﬁt microsimulation model
for the empirical implementation of eq. (1). We furthermore must choose a
speciﬁc functional form for eqs. (2) and (3). For the former we will use a simple
linear speciﬁcation. The latter, however, is more important since we also want
to use its estimates to calculate equivalent incomes. It is therefore necessary to
be able to distinguish diﬀerences in preferences from diﬀerences in aspirations
and expectations. A simple way to do this is to specify the life satisfaction
regression (3) as
Si = α+ piln(yi) + (β + γ
′zi)
′
li + δ
′zi + εi, (4)
where li and zi are again the non-income dimensions and personal characteristics
(e.g. gender, age, etc.) respectively, (α, pi, β, γ, δ) are coeﬃcients to be estimated
and εi is a disturbance term. Eq. (4) is a natural extension of the most common
5With non-monotonic preferences the most natural choice is the individual-speciﬁc best
value for that dimension - see Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015b).
6Two other methods have been used in the literature to derive preference information for
the calculation of equivalent incomes. Decoster and Haan (2014) and Bargain et al. (2013) use
a revealed preferences approach to income-leisure preferences with random utility models of
labour supply. Fleurbaey et al. (2013) and Schokkaert et al. (2013) use contingent valuation
techniques as part of a stated preference approach.
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speciﬁcation in the empirical happiness literature. Diﬀerences in preferences are
modelled through the interaction eﬀects between zi and li. As an example, the
marginal rate of substitution of individual i between yi and lij is given by
MRSi(yi, lij) =
(β + γ′zi)yi
pi
. (5)
The direct eﬀects of zi on life satisfaction, parameterised with δ, and the id-
iosyncratic disturbance term εi are interpreted as capturing aspirations and ex-
pectations. They do not aﬀect the marginal rates of substitution, i.e. the slope
of the indiﬀerence curves, but they do aﬀect the cardinalization of subjective
well-being.
Let the best possible (reference) values of the non-income dimensions be
represented by l¯, and let the equivalent income of individual i be y∗i . The
deﬁnition of equivalent income as the hypothetical income that, combined with
the reference value for all non-income dimensions, would place the individuals
in a situation that they ﬁnd equally good as their actual situation can then be
written as:
Si = α+ pilnyi + (β + γ
′zi)
′
li + δ
′zi + εi = α+ pilny∗i + (β + γ
′zi)
′
l¯+ δ′zi + εi,
which immediately yields
y∗i = yiexp
[(
β + γ′zi
pi
)′ (
li − l¯
)]
. (6)
The estimates of the coeﬃcients in eq. (4) can now be used to calculate equiva-
lent incomes. Diﬀerences in preferences are taken up in this expression through
the diﬀerences in the marginal rates of substitution (compare eqs. (6) and (5)).
Diﬀerences in scaling (as captured by the terms δ′zi + εi) do not appear in eq.
(6).
We now have all the information for the ex-ante evaluation of policy reforms
in terms of individual well-being. Consider for instance that we would like
to evaluate the eﬀect of changing the parameters py of the tax-beneﬁt system
to a set of hypothetical values pCy . The disposable income y
C
i of individual
i under the counterfactual scenario C can be simulated with the tax-beneﬁt
microsimulation model:
yCi = d
(
ωi, xi, p
C
y
)
. (7)
We then introduce yCi into the estimated set of equations (2) to get an estimate
lˆCi of the non-income dimensions. The eﬀect of the counterfactual policy reform
C on life satisfaction can be assessed by comparing the distribution of predicted
life satisfaction Sˆi (obtained using the estimated coeﬃcients in eq. (4)) with
the distribution of SˆCi , where Sˆ
C
i represents predicted life satisfaction with
disposable income yi and non-income dimensions li replaced by y
C
i and lˆ
C
i , re-
spectively. A similar method applies to equivalent incomes, where the estimated
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equivalent incomes of the base situation yˆ∗i can be compared with the estimated
equivalent incomes ˆyC∗i in the counterfactual scenario.
3 Well-being in Sweden
3.1 The data: EUROMOD and EU-SILC
In order to calculate household disposable income under diﬀerent policy reform
scenarios, we use EUROMOD, the EU tax-beneﬁt microsimulation model. EU-
ROMOD simulates cash beneﬁt entitlements and direct personal tax and social
insurance contribution liabilities on the basis of the tax-beneﬁt rules in place
in each of the 28 EU Member States.7 The underlying micro-data used for the
simulations in EUROMOD is EU-SILC, which contains detailed information on
diﬀerent income sources as well as household and individual characteristics.
In addition to detailed income information, our analysis requires informa-
tion on subjective well-being as well as diﬀerent life dimensions that individuals
consider important. We use EU-SILC 2013, which for the ﬁrst time incorporates
information about overall life satisfaction. In fact, the 2013 EU-SILC contains a
whole ad-hoc module on subjective well-being, with information about life satis-
faction and satisfaction with speciﬁc life domains (income, leisure, environment,
etc.) as well as information about emotions (feelings of happiness, depression,
etc.), which are also used in our analysis.
Our analysis is restricted to Sweden because EU-SILC 2013 is not one of
the waves used as input data in EUROMOD. For this reason, the original EU-
SILC 2013 data for Sweden has been updated and modiﬁed according to the
requirements for EUROMOD.8 EU-SILC 2013 contains 15,143 observations for
Sweden. Life satisfaction information is available for individuals aged 16 years or
older and is measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisﬁed at all)
to 10 (fully satisﬁed). Four life dimensions are considered in the estimation:
income, health, being unemployed and housing quality. In our estimations,
income is deﬁned as the logarithm of household disposable income, equivalised
with the modiﬁed OECD scales. Health is measured by self-assessed health,
which is a categorical variable measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (poor
health) to 5 (excellent health). The unemployment dummy takes on the
value of 1 if the person is unemployed according to his/her current reported
7See Sutherland and Figari (2013) for more information on EUROMOD.
8It is important to bear in mind that income information in EU-SILC 2013 refers to incomes
in 2012, while subjective well-being, household characteristics, and labour market information
refer to 2013. For this reason, EUROMOD is used in a ﬁrst instance to simulate disposable
income in 2013, which is then used in the subjective well-being regressions and to calculate
equivalent incomes. Additionally, in order to account for the fact that people might have
changed labour market status between the income reference period and the survey reference
period, we exclude people for whom the current labour market information does not match
the speciﬁc information about months in work, unemployment, or other labour market status
in the income reference period. The results are not aﬀected if 2012 disposable income is used
in the subjective well-being regressions, neither are they aﬀected when the whole sample is
used rather than excluding people with inconsistent labour market information.
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labour market status. Housing quality is derived from a hedonic price equation,
where imputed rent is regressed on a series of housing characteristics, such as
dwelling type, number of rooms in the dwelling, availability of bath, toilet and
telephone, and the presence of problems such as darkness, heat, noise, pollution
and crime. Housing quality is the predicted value of this hedonic regression after
correcting for household size and regional price diﬀerences.9 Our analysis uses
the observations for which all necessary variables have non-missing information.
This leaves us with a sample of 5,336 observations. Descriptive statistics are
presented in table 5 in the Appendix.
3.2 Life satisfaction in Sweden
The estimation results for the life satisfaction equation (4) are given in Table 1.
We take disposable income, health, being unemployed and housing quality as
relevant life dimensions (yi and li). As discussed above, we introduce interaction
terms between life dimensions li and personal characteristics zi into the life
satisfaction equation to model intergroup diﬀerences in preferences. The non-
monetary life dimensions, health, unemployment status and housing quality,
are interacted with dummies for being male, having a higher education degree
and being aged 40 or more. We will also introduce into the policy analysis the
indirect eﬀects of policy changes through their eﬀects on health. Estimates of
eq. (2) for health are shown in Table 2.
Two methodological points should be noted. First, because we are only able
to use a single cross-section of EU-SILC, we cannot implement panel methods
to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the life satisfaction and
health regressions. Failure to control for individual-speciﬁc time-invariant char-
acteristics might result in a bias in the estimated coeﬃcients (Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters, 2004). A second best solution, in the case of a lack of panel data,
is to use information on personality traits. Unfortunately, EU-SILC does not
contain this information either. Therefore, we use information about self-rated
aﬀects or emotions available in EU-SILC 2013, as a sort of third best solution to
control for individual-speciﬁc time-invariant characteristics. More speciﬁcally,
we include four self-rated aﬀects: being very nervous, feeling down in the dumps,
feeling calm and peaceful, and feeling downhearted or depressed. The respon-
dent indicates to what extent she has felt this way over the past four weeks, and
the response is recorded as a categorical variable measured on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (All of the time) to 5 (None of the time). We have reversed
the values of these variables so that higher values reﬂect that the respondent
has felt these emotions more frequently.10
Secondly, there is an issue of potential endogeneity of self-assessed health in
the life satisfaction equation, and even more so due to the fact that these are
9The method is similar to that used by Decancq et al. (2015b). The results are available
upon request from the authors.
10Based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, personality traits appear to be
signiﬁcant predictors of emotions and feelings for the same variables used as controls in our
estimation.
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both self-reported subjective variables. Table 1 therefore shows the results of
2SLS-regressions. Table 2 and tables 7-9 in the Appendix present results for the
ﬁrst stage estimation of health-related variables.11
The estimation results for the life satisfaction equation (4) are are in line
with previous ﬁndings in the literature. The left column (Model 1) shows the
results for when emotions are not included as regressors while the right column
(Model 2) includes the four emotion variables as controls. Income, deﬁned as
the logarithm of equivalised household disposable income, has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on life satisfaction. The three other life dimensions considered
in our analysis, self-assessed health, unemployment status and housing quality,
also produce the expected eﬀects on life satisfaction, although housing quality
is not signiﬁcant in model 2. Note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of
income and other life dimensions decreases under model 2 with the introduction
of the emotion variables. This is in line with the idea that not accounting for
factors related to personality traits might bias the estimates of the life satisfac-
tion regressions. However, since the estimates of all coeﬃcients go down, the
eﬀect on the marginal rates of substitution is smaller than the eﬀect on life sat-
isfaction itself. Other patterns in line with the literature include the U-shaped
relationship between age and life satisfaction as well as the positive eﬀect of be-
ing married. Most interaction terms are not signiﬁcant but present the expected
signs. Under model 2, health is more important for males, while unemployment
seems to aﬀect them less. The ex-ante evaluation of policies in the next section
will be based on the results of Model 2.
The estimates of the health regression (Table 2) are also according to ex-
pectations. Health indicators such as chronic illness and limitation in activities
have a negative eﬀect on self-assessed health, and the same is true for the vari-
ables unmet need. Important for our purposes is the strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect
of income on health, even when we control for education. We will take up this
eﬀect in our evaluation of changes in the tax-beneﬁt system in the next section.
3.3 Equivalent incomes and life satisfaction
We can now calculate the equivalent incomes. Following the normative rea-
soning in the previous section, perfect health is chosen as the reference value
for health and not being unemployed as the reference for employment status.
Since there is no upper boundary for housing quality, we take the 90th per-
centile in the sample as the reference value. Based on these reference values,
the observations for the relevant life dimensions and the estimated coeﬃcients
in Table 1, equivalent incomes can be computed as in equation (6).
The three measures of individual well-being used in this paper (disposable
income, life satisfaction and equivalent income) lead to very diﬀerent results,
reﬂecting their diﬀerent normative assumptions. This is sharply illustrated by
the results in Table 3, where we concentrate on the characteristics of the most
11Table 6 in the Appendix shows that the 2SLS-estimates are broadly consistent with those
that are obtained with OLS or ordered logit models. The estimated eﬀect of health on life
satisfaction is smaller with 2SLS.
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Table 1: Life Satisfaction Regressions (2SLS)
Model 1 Model 2
Disposable Income (log) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.081∗∗ (0.039)
Self-reported health 0.669∗∗∗ (0.085) 0.247∗∗∗ (0.082)
Unemployed -0.870∗∗∗ (0.189) -0.621∗∗∗ (0.170)
Housing (in 1000SEK) 0.129∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.036 (0.043)
Health x Male 0.114 (0.085) 0.143∗ (0.077)
Health x High. Education 0.018 (0.104) 0.095 (0.093)
Health x Age over 40 0.145∗∗ (0.067) 0.041 (0.059)
Unempl. x Male 0.337∗ (0.203) 0.326∗ (0.182)
Unempl. x High. Education -0.504∗ (0.282) -0.328 (0.253)
Unempl. x Age over 40 0.117 (0.202) 0.196 (0.181)
Housing x Male 0.012 (0.028) 0.021 (0.025)
Housing x High. Education -0.037 (0.030) -0.018 (0.027)
Housing x Age over 40 -0.112∗ (0.059) -0.015 (0.052)
Male -0.602∗ (0.364) -0.908∗∗∗ (0.327)
Age -0.055∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.053∗∗∗ (0.010)
Age squared/100 0.060∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.049∗∗∗ (0.008)
Married 0.465∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.433∗∗∗ (0.050)
Separated -0.397∗∗ (0.183) -0.117 (0.165)
Divorced -0.031 (0.075) -0.009 (0.067)
Widow 0.178∗ (0.104) 0.214∗∗ (0.093)
Children 0-15 0.147∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.152∗∗∗ (0.046)
Non-Swede -0.083 (0.100) 0.042 (0.089)
Higher Education -0.120 (0.444) -0.471 (0.398)
South Sweden 0.110∗∗ (0.043) 0.096∗∗ (0.038)
North Sweden 0.236∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.051)
Down in the dumps -0.195∗∗∗ (0.032)
Calm 0.341∗∗∗ (0.028)
Nervous -0.130∗∗∗ (0.025)
Downhearted -0.345∗∗∗ (0.029)
_cons 4.153∗∗∗ (0.572) 6.808∗∗∗ (0.566)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.203 0.361
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: First stage of 2SLS: health
Model 1 Model 2
Chronic Illness -0.360∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.327∗∗∗ (0.019)
Limitation in activities -0.523∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.448∗∗∗ (0.017)
Unmet need for treatment -0.243∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.163∗∗∗ (0.027)
Unmet need for dental treatment -0.251∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.164∗∗∗ (0.031)
Disposable Income (log) 0.101∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.064∗∗∗ (0.019)
Unemployed -0.162∗∗∗ (0.048) -0.032 (0.046)
Housing (in 1000SEK) 0.019∗∗ (0.007) 0.010 (0.007)
Male 0.021 (0.018) -0.031∗ (0.018)
Age -0.004 (0.003) -0.005∗ (0.003)
Age squared/100 -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
Married 0.067∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.051∗∗ (0.024)
Separated -0.007 (0.086) 0.084 (0.082)
Divorced 0.007 (0.035) 0.012 (0.033)
Widow 0.004 (0.048) 0.020 (0.045)
Children 0-15 -0.001 (0.023) -0.005 (0.022)
Non-Swede -0.009 (0.046) 0.033 (0.044)
Higher Education 0.094∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.019)
South Sweden 0.043∗∗ (0.020) 0.032∗ (0.019)
North Sweden 0.008 (0.027) -0.015 (0.025)
Down in the dumps -0.099∗∗∗ (0.015)
Calm 0.098∗∗∗ (0.014)
Nervous -0.065∗∗∗ (0.012)
Downhearted -0.075∗∗∗ (0.014)
_cons 4.130∗∗∗ (0.193) 4.506∗∗∗ (0.199)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.353 0.419
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Portrait of the deprived
Income Satisfaction Eq. Income
Income poor 1.00 . .
Satisfaction poor 0.16 1.00 .
Eq. income poor 0.18 0.32 1.00
Income (SEK/month) 7,692 16,396 16,336
Satisfaction 7.55 4.25 6.59
Health 4.06 3.26 2.66
Unemployment 0.16 0.13 0.23
Housing (1,000 SEK) 4.17 4.61 4.17
Male 0.49 0.44 0.73
Age 37.68 50.65 54.41
Married 0.20 0.28 0.43
Divorced 0.10 0.19 0.16
Widow 0.07 0.07 0.07
Child 0-15 0.28 0.19 0.15
Non-Swede 0.12 0.06 0.06
Higher Education 0.21 0.25 0.28
East Sweden 0.37 0.42 0.37
South Sweden 0.46 0.42 0.41
North Sweden 0.17 0.16 0.22
deprived individuals according to each measure.12 Here, those considered as
the most deprived in terms of subjective well-being are those individuals who
report a level of life satisfaction equal to 5 or less in the 0 to 10 scale. This
sample contains 383 individuals. The second column of table 2 presents the
characteristics of this group of individuals. The ﬁrst column presents the same
information for the 383 individuals with the lowest equivalised household dis-
posable income. Column 3 shows the information for the 383 individuals with
the lowest equivalent income, calculated on the basis of the 2SLS estimations.
The ﬁrst three rows of the table show the overlap between the three well-
being concepts. Only around 16% of those considered poor according to life
satisfaction and 18% of those considered poor according to equivalent income
are among the income poor. In the following rows, we sketch the portrait of the
most deprived individuals according to each of the well-being concepts. These
portraits diﬀer substantially. The income-poor attain a reasonably high level
of life satisfaction and health. They are on average much younger than the
two other groups. By construction, the satisfaction poor and the equivalent
income poor have a larger income. The most deprived according to life satis-
faction have higher income, better health and better housing than those with
12Similar results were shown in Decancq et al. (2015b) with data for Russia.
14
the lowest values of equivalent income. The least satisﬁed are also less likely
to be unemployed compared to the equivalent income deprived. The impor-
tance of the scaling variables (including the idiosyncratic disturbance term) for
life satisfaction is well illustrated by a comparison of the income-poor and the
satisfaction-poor: the latter do better on all dimensions of life, except health.
4 Evaluation of counterfactual policy scenarios
In order to assess the eﬀect of policy reforms on each of our well-being concepts,
we simulate four hypothetical policy reforms. As described before, we use EU-
ROMOD to simulate disposable incomes and eqs. (2)-(6) to derive the eﬀects on
life satisfaction and equivalent incomes. In all counterfactual scenarios, budget
neutrality is achieved by an increase in the top tax rate of government income
tax, which is 25% in Sweden.13 The diﬀerent scenarios are described in de-
tail in subsection 4.1. The following subsections describe the size of the gains
for the gainers, the distribution of gains and losses, the resulting inequality in
well-being and the eﬀects on social welfare. In the case of life satisfaction and
equivalent incomes, we discuss the results with and without taking into account
the indirect eﬀect of income and housing quality on health. All results are based
on the estimates of Model 2 in Table 1.
4.1 Description of policy scenarios
Counterfactual A: Additional Social Assistance Payment
Social assistance in Sweden is a means-tested beneﬁt aimed at low income fam-
ilies. The beneﬁt unit is the nuclear family, including cohabiting partners and
children up to 18 years old, or aged under 20 and receiving the basic child ben-
eﬁt. To be eligible for social assistance, the conditions stipulate that the family
does not have any wealth and the family members are willing to work. The
beneﬁt amount is calculated as the diﬀerence between family needs plus hous-
ing costs and family means. Family needs depend on household size, marital
status of the parents and the age of the children. The beneﬁt is not taxable.
Our ﬁrst counterfactual scenario (reform A) simulates an additional payment of
4,000 SEK per month (around 400 euros) for those families who are recipients
of social assistance.
Counterfactual B: Increase in Child Beneﬁt Amount
Child beneﬁt in Sweden is a universal beneﬁt for families with children aged 0
to 15 years or less than 20 years if in upper secondary education. The child
beneﬁt's basic monthly amount was equal to 1,050 SEK (around 105 euros)
13Personal income tax in Sweden is divided into four parts: government tax, country council
tax, municipality tax and funeral tax. Government income tax in Sweden is assessed individ-
ually and it is made up of three bands. The ﬁrst band is exempted of payment, the rate of
the second band is set at 20%, and the rate of the top band is set at 25%.
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in 2013. Children aged 0 to 15 years receive the beneﬁt every month, while
children aged 16-20 years receive the basic amount for 10 months out of the
year. Additional amounts are paid depending on the number of children in the
family. The beneﬁt is not taxable. In our second counterfactual scenario (reform
B), we simulate an increase in the basic amount of child beneﬁt from 1,050 SEK
to 2,000 SEK per month for children aged 0-15 years.
Counterfactual C: Additional Payment of Housing Allowance for Pen-
sioners
Housing allowance for pensioners is a means-tested beneﬁt targeted at old age
pensioners and persons with a disability pension. The assessment unit is the
nuclear family, including cohabiting partners and children up to 18 years old,
or aged under 20 and receiving the basic child beneﬁt. Individuals aged 65
and above are entitled to the age allowance, while individuals younger than 65
are entitled to the disability allowance. The allowance decreases with income
over certain income thresholds, which are dependent on the marital status of
the recipients. The beneﬁt is not taxable. In our third counterfactual scenario
(reform C), we simulate an additional payment of 2,000 SEK per month (around
200 euros) for the recipients of the housing allowance for pensioners.
Counterfactual D: Improvement in Housing Quality
Finally, we simulate a policy reform, which does not involve a monetary transfer
and therefore has no positive eﬀect on disposable income. In particular, we
simulate an improvement in housing quality of half a standard deviation for the
4% of individuals in our sample who report low housing quality.
The cost diﬀerences between the counterfactual reforms are reﬂected in the
increases in the top government tax rate, which are necessary to achieve budget
neutrality. The top tax rate would need to increase from 25% to 34.8% under
reform A; to 45.6% under reform B; and to 33.6% under reform C. Assessing the
cost of reform D is less straightforward since we need information on the likely
costs of housing improvements. In our analysis, we assume that the simulated
improvement in housing under reform D would require half a month's work
for a person employed in construction, plumbing, building ﬁnishing and related
trades. In 2013, the average salary of a person employed in this sector was 26,900
SEK per month.14 Under this assumption, the cost of improving housing quality
would be 13,450 SEK per household for the 4% of our sample that would beneﬁt
from such reform. Budget neutrality is then achieved by an increase in the top
government tax rate from 25% to 49.8%.
14See Statistics Sweden: http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-
area/Labour-market/Wages-salaries-and-labour-costs/Salary-structures-whole-economy/
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Figure 2: Percentage change in disposable income, all reforms: gainers
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4.2 The eﬀects on the gainers
A ﬁrst step to assess the eﬀect of the hypothetical reforms on our measures of
individual well-being is to compare the eﬀects on the gainers, i.e. the recipients
of the additional payments or the beneﬁciaries of the housing improvement. The
numerical results are given in Table 10 in the Appendix. Figures 2-5 summarise
the main ﬁndings for the diﬀerent well-being measures. Note that the propor-
tion of gainers varies across the scenarios. Under reform A, around 2.89% of
individuals in our sample would beneﬁt from an increase in social assistance.
The proportion of beneﬁciaries under reform B would be substantially larger,
with around 13.31% of our sample receiving increased payments from child ben-
eﬁt. Under reform C, 6.1% of our sample would beneﬁt from an increase in
housing beneﬁt for pensioners, while by construction, 4% of our sample would
beneﬁt from an improvement in housing quality under reform D. Since all four
reform scenarios are assumed to be ﬁnanced by an increase in government tax,
the proportion of people losing (those paying higher taxes) as a result of the
reforms equals 4.36% of our sample in all four cases.
When we consider equivalised household disposable income, reform A (an
increase in social assistance) results in the highest average increase for the gain-
ers, followed by reform C (an increase in housing beneﬁt for pensioners) and
reform B (an increase in child beneﬁt). The improvement of housing quality
(reform D) has a slightly negative eﬀect on average disposable income because
the gainers do not receive any additional income from the housing reform,
while a few of them must pay additional taxes.
In the case of life satisfaction, Figure 3 presents two sets of results. The
left-hand chart presents the percentage increase in average predicted life satis-
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faction for gainers when the indirect eﬀects of income and housing quality on
health are not taken into account (S1) and the right-hand chart presents the
results when these indirect eﬀects are accounted for (S2). Similar results are
shown in Figure 4 for equivalent incomes, where the panels EI1 and EI2 show
the gains with and without the positive feedback eﬀects through health and
housing, respectively. Unsurprisingly, the gains of the diﬀerent policy reforms
are larger when the indirect eﬀects are taken into account. This ﬁnding must
be interpreted cautiously. Raising the income of a person will not immediately
improve his/her health. Yet, the presence of a positive eﬀect in the longer run
is extensively documented in the literature, and neglecting it would certainly
lead to an underestimation of the well-being gains for the concerned groups.
The importance of feedback eﬀects can further be illustrated for reform A.
A large fraction of those who would beneﬁt from the additional social assistance
payments reported having unmet needs for medical and/or dental treatment.
Given the substantial increase in social assistance that reform A represents
(4,000 SEK per month), one could assume that (part of) the additional beneﬁts
would be used to cover the costs of medical and dental treatment needed. This
would further increase the eﬀect of the policy on health, and hence on well-being.
Figure 5 presents the percentage increase in average equivalent income and pre-
dicted life satisfaction for gainers under reform A, when the additional eﬀects on
unmet needs for treatment through health are taken into account. S3 and EI3
represent, respectively, life satisfaction and equivalent income of gainers when
unmet need for medical and dental treatment are assumed to be covered but
the indirect eﬀect of income through health is not taken into account. S4 and
EI4 assume that unmet needs for medical and dental treatment are covered and
the indirect eﬀect of income through health is taken into account. Accounting
for the potential eﬀect of an increase in social assistance on treatment of unmet
medical and dental needs signiﬁcantly increases life satisfaction (S4) and equiv-
alent incomes (EI4). Unmet needs of medical treatment are not only caused
by lack of income; therefore, it is a very strong assumption that they would be
fully covered after an income transfer. In the sequel we will not incorporate this
eﬀect into the evaluation results. Still, Figure 5 illustrates that interesting and
important questions come to the fore and can in principle be tackled when one
moves to a richer evaluative framework.
Returning to Figures 3 and 4, it turns out that the proportional gains in life
satisfaction and equivalent income realised by the reforms are much smaller than
the gains in terms of disposable income (except under reform D, as expected).
This is of course to be expected given that in the broader well-being concepts,
income is only one of the relevant life dimensions, and given that eq. (4) implies
a decreasing marginal utility of income. On average, life satisfaction increases
less than 1% under any counterfactual reform. The eﬀects on equivalent incomes
are larger, because there the (cardinal) eﬀect of decreasing marginal utility of
income does not play a role. Average equivalent income, E1, for gainers increases
more than 100% under reform D, 40% under reform A, 19% under reform C and
1.4% under reform B. If indirect eﬀects through health are taken into account,
equivalent income, E2, increases by as much as 150% under reform D and 50%
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under reform A. It is interesting to observe that the ranking of reforms in terms
of their eﬀect on gainers is the same for equivalent income and life satisfaction,
but that it is diﬀerent from the ranking obtained with disposable income. More
speciﬁcally, the hypothetical non-monetary reform, D, has the largest eﬀect on
gainers in terms of life satisfaction and equivalent income, followed by reforms
A, C and B.
Figure 3: Percentage change in life satisfaction, all reforms: gainers
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Figure 4: Percentage change in equivalent income, all reforms: gainers
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Figure 5: Percentage change in life satisfaction and equivalent income, reform
A: gainers
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4.3 Global distribution of gains and losses
We now broaden our scope to assess the eﬀects of our reforms over the whole pop-
ulation. Figures 6-8 present the gains and losses in terms of disposable income,
life satisfaction and equivalent income for the diﬀerent deciles of the respective
distributions in the sample. Positive eﬀects (upward pointing bars) reﬂect gains
from the hypothetical reforms, while negative eﬀects (downward pointing bars)
are due to the increase in taxes required to achieve revenue neutrality. Table
11 in the Appendix presents the overall averages for these well-being concepts
under the baseline and each of the counterfactual scenarios. Changes in these
global averages are shown at the utmost right of the ﬁgures.
Figure 6 shows that individuals in the ﬁrst and second deciles of disposable
income gain the most from reforms A (increase in social assistance) and C (in-
crease in housing beneﬁt for pensioners), while the increase of equivalised house-
hold disposable income under reform B (increase in child beneﬁt) is roughly the
same for all decile groups except the ninth and tenth. The top income decile
experiences a particularly large decrease in disposable income as a result of
the increase in income taxes to ﬁnance the reforms. For the whole population,
reform C results in the highest increase of average equivalised household dis-
posable income, followed by reform A. Reform B decreases average disposable
income by 0.2%, while reform D (improvement of housing quality) decreases av-
erage disposable income by around 1.3%, given the increase in taxes necessary
to ﬁnance the cost of such policy.
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Figure 6: Percentage change in household disposable income by income decile
group: all reforms
-
5
0
5
10
15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All
A B C D
For life satisfaction and equivalent incomes, we again show the results for
both cases, one where the indirect eﬀects of income and housing quality on
health are neglected (S1 and EI1) and one where they are taken into account
(S2 and EI2). Figure 7 shows that the eﬀects of all reforms in terms of life
satisfaction are small across all decile groups. The bottom deciles of the satis-
faction distribution gain the most from reforms A, C and D, while the eﬀects of
reform B are roughly similar across all groups. The eﬀect of the reforms across
the distribution of equivalent incomes (ﬁgure 8) are less clear than in the case
of income and life satisfaction. The bottom deciles of the equivalent income
distribution (in particular the second decile) beneﬁt the most from reforms A,
C and D, but there are also relatively large gains for deciles 6 and 7, especially
under reforms A and D. The top decile group experiences an important decrease
in equivalent incomes as a result of the increase in tax payments.
21
Figure 7: Percentage change in life satisfaction by satisfaction decile group: all
reforms
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It is interesting to compare the eﬀects the reforms have on the global average.
Average life satisfaction for the whole sample increases the most under reform D,
followed by reform A, C and B. In contrast with these results, all reforms have a
negative eﬀect on the global average of equivalent incomes. Reform D decreases
average equivalent income the most, followed by reforms B, A and C. In that
respect, the results for equivalent incomes are more like those for disposable
income (ﬁgure 6). This result is explained by the diﬀerent cardinalization of the
well-being measures: the equivalent income is linear in actual income (see eq.
(6)), while income has a decreasing marginal eﬀect on life satisfaction (because
of the logarithmic speciﬁcation of eq. (4)). Even for egalitarians, however, this
is not much of a problem, since inequality aversion is a normative value that
can (and should) be reﬂected in the social welfare function. We will return to
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this issue in subsection 4.5.
Figure 8: Percentage change in equivalent income by equivalent income decile
group: all reforms
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4.4 Well-being inequality
We now summarise the eﬀects of our reforms on the Gini coeﬃcient. Table 12
in the Appendix also presents results for a generalised Gini with parameter of
inequality aversion, r=5, which gives more weight to individuals at the bottom
of the income distribution.
Figure 9 presents the percentage change in income inequality for each of our
hypothetical reform scenarios. Gini coeﬃcients decrease by more than 3% under
all reforms. Reform B decreases inequality the most, followed by reform A, D
and C, but the diﬀerences are not very large. For life satisfaction (Figure 10)
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Figure 9: Percentage change in income inequality (gini) all scenarios
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and equivalent income (Figure 11), we again present results with and without
taking into account the indirect eﬀect of income and housing quality on health.
The inequality reduction is larger in the latter case. The eﬀect of the reforms
on satisfaction inequality is very small compared to that on income inequality.
Reform D decreases satisfaction inequality the most, followed by reforms A,
C and B. For equivalent income, the eﬀect of the reforms is larger than for
life satisfaction but still much lower than for disposable income. Equivalent
income inequality decreases the most under reform D, followed by reforms B, A
and C. Not surprisingly, implementing a richer evaluative framework has huge
consequences for the evaluation of the non-income policy reform.
Figure 10: Percentage change in satisfaction inequality (gini) all scenarios
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Figure 11: Percentage change in equivalent income inequality (gini) all scenarios
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4.5 Social welfare
Ultimately, what we are interested in are the results on social welfare, consider-
ing both the aggregate eﬀect and the eﬀect on inequality. For that purpose we
calculate social welfare as
SWρ = A(1 − Iρ), (8)
where A is average well-being and Iρ is the Generalised Gini for inequality
aversion ρ. For ρ = 0 we get Iρ = 0, and hence social welfare reduces to
the (unweighed) global average of well-being that was given in Table 11 in the
Appendix. Table 13 in the Appendix presents the results for (8) for all the policy
scenarios and for two values of ρ. Inequality is measured by the Gini-coeﬃcient
for ρ = 2. A value of ρ = 5 implies that we give a larger weight to the well-being
of persons at the bottom of the well-being distribution.
The welfare rankings of the policy reforms for the diﬀerent concepts of well-
being are shown in Table 4. For simplicity, we only consider the results where we
take into account the eﬀects of income and housing on health, i.e. the scenarios
S2 and EI2. The results allow us to draw some important lessons.
First, the ranking of policy reforms depends crucially on two normative
choices: the measure of individual well-being and the degree of inequality aver-
sion. Focusing only on disposable income may be very misleading if society
prefers a broader concept of well-being, be it life satisfaction or equivalent in-
come.
Second, since all our policy measures reduce inequality, more policies become
welfare-improving, compared to the base, if the inequality aversion in the social
welfare function increases. This is most outspoken for equivalent incomes, where
all policies decrease welfare for ρ = 0, but increase welfare for ρ = 5. For life
satisfaction, all policies are already welfare improving for ρ = 0. This result can
easily be explained. As mentioned before, for any individual, equivalent income
is linear in disposable income. Pure income transfers may have welfare eﬀects
due to diﬀerences in preferences and the levels of the other life dimensions (see
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Table 4: Ranking of policies
disposable income life satisfaction (S2) equivalent income (EI2)
ρ = 0 ρ = 2 ρ = 5 ρ = 0 ρ = 2 ρ = 5 ρ = 0 ρ = 2 ρ = 5
C C A D D D base B D
A A C A A A C A B
base B B C C C A base A
B base base B B B B C C
D D D base base base D D base
eq. (6)), but these eﬀects will be rather small. If one cares about well-being
inequality this must be taken up in the normative inequality aversion - a positive
inequality aversion will lead to the consequence of an increase in social welfare
resulting from an income transfer from someone with a high level of equivalent
income to someone with a low level of equivalent income. This is what we observe
in Table 4: as soon as ρ starts increasing, more inequality reducing policies also
become welfare improving. The situation is diﬀerent if we take subjective life
satisfaction as a measure of well-being. This cardinalization implies declining
marginal utility of income and it is well known that if this is the case, income
transfers from rich to poor are welfare-increasing, even in the (utilitarian) case
ρ = 0.
Third, implementing a richer well-being framework makes it possible to eval-
uate non-income policies. A policy aiming to improve the housing quality of the
poor (our reform D) can never be welfare-improving if one only considers dis-
posable income, because in that narrow setting there are only costs and no
beneﬁts. It is preferred over all the income transfer policies, however, if we
evaluate well-being in terms of life satisfaction or in terms of equivalent income
with a suﬃciently large degree of inequality aversion.
5 Conclusion
Microsimulation is the preferred method for the ex-ante evaluation of policy
scenarios. Until now applications have mostly been restricted to the simulation
of disposable incomes. This goes against the present (commendable) trend to
also take into account other non-material life dimensions in the evaluation of
well-being. We have shown that in principle it is easy to analyse the microsimu-
lation results within a richer evaluative framework. This requires simulation of
the eﬀects of a policy on other life dimensions, and for many of these eﬀects there
is already substantial empirical evidence. Aggregating the diﬀerent dimensions
into one scalar measure of individual well-being requires making ethical choices.
Yet these are genuine and important questions, and neglecting them leads to an
undesirable impoverishment of the policy debate. Life satisfaction is a natural
choice and the empirical evidence for its determinants is growing rapidly. It
raises the issue, however, as to whether, for a distributional analysis, we should
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accept that individuals are compensated when they are less satisﬁed due to hav-
ing higher expectations - or are less compensated for misfortune if they more
easily adapt to their new situation. If the response to these questions is neg-
ative, one must look for an alternative measure of individual well-being. We
proposed the equivalent income measure as a possible candidate. Our empirical
application for Sweden illustrates the importance of this choice. In particular,
individuals with the lowest levels of life satisfaction have on average a higher in-
come and better health, and are less likely to be unemployed than those deprived
in terms of equivalent incomes.
We then simulated the eﬀects of four hypothetical policy reforms using the
three measures of well-being (disposable income, life satisfaction and equivalent
income). The simulation results conﬁrm that the choice of well-being measure is
important for the welfare ranking of policies. An important aspect of this is that
implementing a richer evaluative framework makes it possible to also analyse
the eﬀects of non-monetary policy reforms, and to compare the welfare eﬀects
of such reforms with those of tax-beneﬁt policies. Moreover, feedback eﬀects
between the diﬀerent life dimensions are important and can easily be taken into
account. This was illustrated for the (well-known) relationship between health
(care) and income.
This paper presents a simple illustration of how microsimulation techniques
can be used to evaluate policy reforms in terms of individual well-being. Our
empirical work has, however, some obvious shortcomings. Ideally, one would es-
timate a full model involving all the interactions between the relevant dimensions
of life. Future research would, in particular, beneﬁt from the availability of mi-
crosimulation models for panel data, allowing one to account for the long-term
relationship between a broad range of life dimensions. Moreover, for equiva-
lent incomes, the identiﬁcation of preferences on the basis of a life satisfaction
equation is only a ﬁrst step (see Decancq et al., 2015b for a more extensive
discussion). The identiﬁcation of preferences could, for instance, be improved
by the inclusion of information on stated preferences in surveys. More work is
needed to correct these shortcomings. Yet, the direction this work should take
is clear. Given the obvious limitations of focusing only on disposable incomes,
it seems important to start walking that route.
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Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
mean st.dev.
Income (SEK/month) 21,309 10,707
Satisfaction 8.04 1.55
Health 4.15 0.81
Unemployment 0.04 0.19
Housing (1,000 SEK) 5.30 1.64
Male 0.49 0.50
Age 49.76 18.58
Married 0.48 0.50
Divorced 0.11 0.32
Widow 0.06 0.24
Child 0-15 0.28 0.45
Non-Swede 0.04 0.19
Higher education 0.33 0.47
East Sweden 0.39 0.49
South Sweden 0.44 0.50
North Sweden 0.17 0.38
Nervous 1.85 0.99
Down 1.34 0.74
Calm 3.99 0.81
Downhearted 1.66 0.87
Number of observations 5,336
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Table 6: Life Satisfaction Regressions: OLS and ordered logit
OLS Ordered logit
Disposable Income (log) 0.082∗∗ (0.039) 0.139∗∗ (0.060)
Self-reported health 0.374∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.061)
Unemployed -0.630∗∗∗ (0.169) -0.856∗∗∗ (0.268)
Housing (in 1000SEK) -0.012 (0.029) -0.018 (0.044)
Health x Male 0.075∗ (0.043) 0.119∗ (0.065)
Health x High. Education 0.064 (0.048) 0.099 (0.071)
Health x Age over 40 -0.041∗ (0.024) -0.062∗ (0.035)
Unempl. x Male 0.324∗ (0.181) 0.412 (0.277)
Unempl. x High. Education -0.317 (0.251) -0.327 (0.369)
Unempl. x Age over 40 0.221 (0.179) 0.290 (0.273)
Housing x Male 0.026 (0.025) 0.032 (0.037)
Housing x High. Education -0.013 (0.027) 0.000 (0.039)
Housing x Age over 40 0.051∗ (0.027) 0.079∗ (0.040)
Male -0.649∗∗∗ (0.197) -1.012∗∗∗ (0.300)
Age -0.042∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.076∗∗∗ (0.011)
Age squared/100 0.042∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.077∗∗∗ (0.010)
Married 0.427∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.666∗∗∗ (0.072)
Separated -0.121 (0.164) 0.088 (0.257)
Divorced -0.007 (0.067) 0.020 (0.100)
Widow 0.204∗∗ (0.092) 0.204 (0.139)
Children 0-15 0.155∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.067)
Non-Swede 0.025 (0.089) 0.127 (0.131)
Higher Education -0.378∗ (0.223) -0.683∗∗ (0.330)
South Sweden 0.097∗∗ (0.038) 0.129∗∗ (0.056)
North Sweden 0.178∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.214∗∗∗ (0.075)
Down in the dumps -0.188∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.204∗∗∗ (0.047)
Calm 0.338∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.543∗∗∗ (0.043)
Nervous -0.128∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.189∗∗∗ (0.037)
Downhearted -0.341∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.478∗∗∗ (0.043)
_cons 6.183∗∗∗ (0.449)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.363
pseudo R2 0.121
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: First stage of 2SLS: Health x Male
Model 1 Model 2
Chronic x male -0.369∗∗∗ (0.020) -0.357∗∗∗ (0.020)
Limited x male -0.582∗∗∗ (0.019) -0.555∗∗∗ (0.019)
Unmet treatment x male -0.245∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.210∗∗∗ (0.029)
Unmet dental treatment x male -0.252∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.220∗∗∗ (0.032)
Disposable Income (log) 0.025∗ (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
Unemployed -0.117∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.064∗ (0.033)
Housing (in 1000SEK) 0.015∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.011∗∗ (0.005)
Male 5.066∗∗∗ (0.025) 4.999∗∗∗ (0.025)
Age -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
Age squared/100 0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002)
Married 0.065∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.018)
Separated 0.068 (0.060) 0.105∗ (0.059)
Divorced 0.031 (0.025) 0.033 (0.024)
Widow 0.077∗∗ (0.033) 0.083∗∗ (0.033)
Children 0-15 -0.007 (0.016) -0.010 (0.016)
Non-Swede -0.039 (0.033) -0.026 (0.032)
Higher Education 0.046∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.014)
South Sweden 0.041∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.014)
North Sweden 0.019 (0.019) 0.009 (0.018)
Down in the dumps -0.042∗∗∗ (0.011)
Calm 0.035∗∗∗ (0.010)
Nervous -0.031∗∗∗ (0.009)
Downhearted -0.021∗∗ (0.010)
_cons -0.143 (0.133) 0.091 (0.143)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.956 0.958
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: First stage of 2SLS: Health x Higher Education
Model 1 Model 2
Chronic x high edu -0.435∗∗∗ (0.019) -0.424∗∗∗ (0.019)
Limited x high edu -0.478∗∗∗ (0.020) -0.469∗∗∗ (0.019)
Unmet treatment x high edu -0.201∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.186∗∗∗ (0.027)
Unmet dental treatment x high edu -0.244∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.223∗∗∗ (0.034)
Disposable Income (log) 0.036∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.025∗∗ (0.011)
Unemployed -0.039 (0.026) -0.005 (0.026)
Housing (in 1000SEK) 0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
Male 0.014 (0.010) -0.002 (0.010)
Age 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Age squared/100 -0.004∗∗ (0.002) -0.004∗∗ (0.002)
Married 0.018 (0.014) 0.013 (0.014)
Separated -0.023 (0.048) 0.001 (0.047)
Divorced 0.009 (0.019) 0.010 (0.019)
Widow 0.048∗ (0.026) 0.050∗ (0.026)
Children 0-15 -0.006 (0.013) -0.007 (0.013)
Non-Swede -0.010 (0.026) 0.000 (0.025)
Higher Education 5.023∗∗∗ (0.025) 5.006∗∗∗ (0.025)
South Sweden 0.008 (0.011) 0.005 (0.011)
North Sweden -0.019 (0.015) -0.026∗ (0.015)
Down in the dumps -0.010 (0.009)
Calm 0.030∗∗∗ (0.008)
Nervous -0.022∗∗∗ (0.007)
Downhearted -0.018∗∗ (0.008)
_cons -0.361∗∗∗ (0.105) -0.250∗∗ (0.113)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.970 0.971
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: First stage of 2SLS: Health x Over 40
Model 1 Model 2
Chronic x over 40 -0.495∗∗∗ (0.043) -0.455∗∗∗ (0.042)
Limited x over 40 0.527∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.569∗∗∗ (0.032)
Unmet treatment x over 40 -0.113∗ (0.066) -0.035 (0.065)
Unmet dental treatment x over 40 -0.027 (0.078) 0.078 (0.077)
Disposable Income (log) 0.113∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.069∗∗ (0.035)
Unemployed 0.058 (0.084) 0.200∗∗ (0.083)
Housing (in 1000SEK) 0.102∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.089∗∗∗ (0.013)
Male -0.022 (0.032) -0.078∗∗ (0.032)
Age 0.245∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.238∗∗∗ (0.006)
Age squared/100 -0.181∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.178∗∗∗ (0.006)
Married -0.030 (0.045) -0.045 (0.045)
Separated -0.172 (0.152) -0.080 (0.149)
Divorced -0.016 (0.062) -0.014 (0.061)
Widow -0.235∗∗∗ (0.084) -0.215∗∗∗ (0.083)
Children 0-15 -0.257∗∗∗ (0.042) -0.255∗∗∗ (0.041)
Non-Swede -0.077 (0.082) -0.033 (0.080)
Higher Education -0.134∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.126∗∗∗ (0.034)
South Sweden 0.083∗∗ (0.035) 0.070∗∗ (0.035)
North Sweden 0.065 (0.047) 0.037 (0.046)
Down in the dumps -0.088∗∗∗ (0.028)
Calm 0.157∗∗∗ (0.025)
Nervous -0.059∗∗∗ (0.022)
Downhearted -0.066∗∗ (0.026)
_cons -6.048∗∗∗ (0.336) -5.645∗∗∗ (0.360)
N 5336 5336
R2 0.685 0.698
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Average values under the baseline and counterfactual scenarios for gainers
Base A Reform A Base B Reform B Base C Reform C Base D Reform D
Disposable income 8,830 12,576 19,699 20,144 11,682 13,682 13,035 13,002
Equivalent income (EI1) 570 784 4,970 5,039 305 363 133 280
Equivalent income (EI2) 570 861 4,970 5,064 305 381 133 332
Equivalent income (EI3) 570 823 - - - - - -
Equivalent income (EI4) 570 904 - - - - - -
Life satisfaction (S1) 6.7938 6.8221 7.9505 7.9534 7.4455 7.4579 7.4875 7.5446
Life satisfaction (S2) 6.7938 6.8302 7.9505 7.9542 7.4455 7.4614 7.4875 7.5580
Life satisfaction (S3) 6.7938 6.8085 - - - - - -
Life satisfaction (S4) 6.7938 6.8449 - - - - - -
Table 11: Average values under the baseline and counterfactual scenarios
Base Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform D
Disposable income 20,184 20,186 20,145 20,215 19,909
Equivalent income (EI1) 4,515 4,473 4,457 4,476 4,397
Equivalent income (EI2) 4,515 4,463 4,444 4,466 4,368
Equivalent income (EI3) 4,515 4,475 - - -
Equivalent income (EI4) 4,515 4,465 - - -
Life satisfaction (S1) 7.9428 7.9434 7.9432 7.9434 7.9445
Life satisfaction (S2) 7.9428 7.9436 7.9433 7.9436 7.9449
Life satisfaction (S3) 7.9428 7.9432 - - -
Life satisfaction (S4) 7.9428 7.9441 - - -
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Table 12: Inequality under the baseline and counterfactual scenarios
S-Gini (r=2) S-Gini (r=5)
Base Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform D Base Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform D
Disposable income 0.24472 0.23564 0.23554 0.23635 0.23593 0.44680 0.42901 0.43925 0.43416 0.43938
Equivalent income (EI1) 0.81593 0.81404 0.81220 0.81435 0.81164 0.99403 0.99393 0.99390 0.99394 0.99378
Equivalent income (EI2) 0.81593 0.81351 0.81126 0.81392 0.81058 0.99403 0.99390 0.99387 0.99392 0.99372
Equivalent income (EI3) 0.81593 0.81390 - - - 0.99403 0.99391 - - -
Equivalent income (EI4) 0.81593 0.81337 - - - 0.99403 0.99389 - - -
Life satisfaction (S1) 0.06438 0.06432 0.06437 0.06435 0.06427 0.15205 0.15187 0.15202 0.15198 0.15179
Life satisfaction (S2) 0.06438 0.06430 0.06437 0.06434 0.06425 0.15205 0.15182 0.15201 0.15196 0.15174
Life satisfaction (S3) 0.06438 0.06434 - - - 0.15205 0.15191 - - -
Life satisfaction (S4) 0.06438 0.06426 - - - 0.15205 0.15169 - - -
Table 13: Social welfare under the baseline and counterfactual scenarios
SW (r=2) SW (r=5)
Base Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform D Base Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform D
Disposable income 15,244.7 15,429.7 15,400.3 15,437.2 15,211.8 11,165.8 11,526.2 11,296.5 11,438.4 11,161.3
Equivalent income (EI1) 831.1 831.9 837.0 831.0 828.2 26.96 27.15 27.19 27.11 27.34
Equivalent income (EI2) 831.1 832.3 838.7 831.0 827.3 26.96 27.22 27.26 27.16 27.44
Equivalent income (EI3) 831.1 832.8 - - - 26.96 27.23 - - -
Equivalent income (EI4) 831.1 833.2 - - - 26.96 27.30 - - -
Life satisfaction (S1) 7.4314 7.4325 7.4319 7.4322 7.4340 6.7351 6.7371 6.7357 6.7362 6.7387
Life satisfaction (S2) 7.4314 7.4328 7.4320 7.4324 7.4345 6.7351 6.7376 6.7358 6.7365 6.7394
Life satisfaction (S3) 7.4314 7.4322 - - - 6.7351 6.7366 - - -
Life satisfaction (S4) 7.4314 7.4336 - - - 6.7351 6.7390 - - -
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